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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 44 1999 NUMBER 4
Articles
O.K. CORRAL II: POLICY ISSUES IN MUNICIPAL SUITS AGAINST
GUN MANUFACTURERS*
FRANK J. VANDALL**
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE are several epidemics in the United States today that are plac-
ing massive losses on states, cities and families.' They are tobacco,
alcohol and guns. 2 They affect our society in concert. Although govern-
* See Gunfight at the OK Corral (1957). In the movie Gunfight at the O.K. Corral,
there was no concern about the damage to the corral. In the new municipal suits,
however, the question becomes who should pay for the damages to the cities that
flow from the continuing gun violence.
** Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; B.A., 1964, Washington
and Jefferson College; J.D., 1967, Vanderbilt University; LL.M., 1968, S.J.D., 1979,
University of Wisconsin. I appreciate the research assistance of Colin M.
Bernardino. Mistakes are mine, however.
1. See S. 2047, 100th Cong. § (a) (2) (1988) (noting that approximately one-
half of all accidental deaths, suicides and homicides are alcohol related); H.R.
4441, 100th Cong. § 1(2) (1988) (noting that alcohol use costs American economy
$1.2 billion per year and alcohol related accidents cause over 23,987 deaths per
year); see also Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or
Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 584 (1995) (noting that men who
kill their domestic partners are prone to alcohol abuse); Rachel Gottlieb & Trish
Willingham, Mayors See Verdict as Ammunition; Officials in Bridgeport and Other Cities
Across the Nation Said a Federal Jury's Finding Gun Makers Negligent Serves as Motivation
to Pursue Similar Lawsuits, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 13, 1999, at B1 (reporting that
jury awarded $560,000 to one plaintiff). The Chicago suit alleges that manufactur-
ers and distributors saturate suburban gun markets knowing that most guns
purchased are brought into the city where handgun ownership is regulated. See
Stevenson Swanson, Jurors Find 15 Gunmakers Negligent in N.Y. Shootings, CHI. TIB.,
Feb. 12, 1999, at Al (noting suit that alleged gun manufacturers designed and
marketed their guns to facilitate illegal sales to criminals). Ajury in a suit brought
against handgun manufacturers in a New York federal court returned a plaintiff's
verdict under a similar market saturation theory. See id. (noting that many guns
were sold in Southern states with lax gun laws and illegally sent to other states with
stricter laws); see also Fox Butterfield, Chicago is Suing Over Guns From Suburbs, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1998, at A4 (noting that guns are creating "excess" costs for Chi-
cago's police, fire departments and public hospitals).
2. For a discussion of tobacco, alcohol and guns, see infra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
(547)
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mental units have not yet sued the alcohol manufacturers, several cities
have sued gun manufacturers for the costs of gun-related violence.3
The United States is the most violent country in the world not cur-
rently at war. In 1993, for example, one American child died every ninety-
two minutes from gunfire, an average of over fifteen children each day.4
Additionally, approximately 35,000 Americans die from gunfire each
year.5 By way of comparison, there were 9,390 gun-related homicides in
the United States in 1996, but only fifteen in Japan and thirty in Great
Britain. 6 Until the recent suits by Atlanta, Bridgeport, Chicago, New Orle-
ans and Miami to recover the costs of dealing with gun-related violence,
American society had largely ignored this violent loss of life.7
This Article does not discuss the issues involved in the Second
Amendment debate.8 Instead, this Article assumes that the Constitution
will be interpreted to permit suits by cities against gun manufacturers to
3. See Bill Rankin, Cities Firing Back at Gun Industry, Tobacco II, Lawyers See Court-
room Assault on Makers of Firearms as a Payback Bonanza for Crime in Streets, ATLANTAJ.
& CONST., Nov. 29, 1998, at Al (noting that cities of Atlanta, New Orleans and
Chicago have already filed suits against gun manufacturers).
4. See Studies Assess Lethal Toll of Gun Violence, LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS, Apr.
15, 1996, at 5 (noting that of 5,751 gunfire deaths of children in 1993, 957 of those
killed were under 15 years of age).
5. See Rankin, supra note 3, at Al (noting that gun manufacturers contributed
to death total by marketing their products to foster growth of underground market
sales).
6. See Carlos Campos, Litigation Won't Fix Problem, Some Say, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Feb. 5, 1999, at A12 (reporting on Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms study).
7. See Butterfield, supra note 1, at A4 (noting that cities of Chicago, New Orle-
ans, Miami, Atlanta and Bridgeport have all filed suits against gun manufacturers
in recent months); Dahleen Glanton, NRA, Firearms Industry Work to Fight Cities'
Suits, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1999, at 5 (noting that several cities are suing for costs of
medical care and intervention resulting from gun violence); Rankin, supra note 3,
at Al (noting that tobacco lawsuits were filed several years before lawsuits against
gun manufacturers).
8. Compare Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on
the Second Amendment, 45 EMORy L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996) (quoting Professor Daniel
D. Polsby as saying, "almost all the qualified historians and constitutional-law schol-
ars who have studied the subject [concur]. The overwhelming weight of authority
affirms the Second Amendment establishes an individual right to bear arms .... "),
with Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REv. 57, 58 (1995) (arguing that Second Amend-
ment does not extend right to bear arms for self-defense or hunting). Essentially,
articles on the constitutional issue and the right to bear arms divide into two
camps. Some scholars argue that the Second Amendment of the Constitution es-
tablishes a right to possess a gun. Other academics contend that application of the
Second Amendment is limited to the militia and, therefore, cases and statutes that
restrict ownership and possession of various guns would survive constitutional chal-
lenge. In support of the latter contention, Professor Herz notes the following:
[T]he courts have consistently found that the Second Amendment guar-
antees a right to bear arms only for those individuals who are part of a
"well regulated Militia"-today's stateside National Guard. Despite wide-
spread belief to the contrary, the courts have clearly held that there is no
right to bear arms for self-defense, hunting, or shooting competitions,
[Vol. 44: p. 547
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recover the losses that result from dealing with the damages caused by gun
violence. 9 This Article will address the economic,-cause in fact and proxi-
mate cause policy issues in these suits.10
The enormous cost to local government from gun violence provides
the foundation for the recent suits brought by several cities. Chicago, for
example, is asking for $433 million in its complaint against gun manufac-
turers.11 These expenses include the hiring of extra police, cleaning up
after a shooting in a public area and the medical costs associated with
treating gunshot victims. The expenses also include welfare expenditures
for surviving families and disabled victims and, in some cases, the added
cost of extra police who deal with gun violence. 12 What has not been cal-
culated are the enormous secondary costs that grow out of living in walled
communities. Homes today are advertised to indicate whether they are
gated or have substantial security. 13 One of the reasons for the deteriora-
tion of our large cities is the fear of being mugged, murdered or raped by
someone using a gun to carry out their threats. The city of Bridgeport,
Connecticut, for example, is suing for the cost of the deterioration of the
city.
1 4
much less arsenal-building in preparation for resistance of potential do-
mestic tyranny.
Id.
9. For a discussion of the historic nature of the damage suits against gun man-
ufacturers, see infra note 200 and accompanying text. In October, 1999 the
Supreme Court denied cert. to two cases that raised the constitutional right to own
a gun. See Richard Carelli, Supreme Court Twice Rejects Gun Ban Appeals, ATLANTAJ.
& CONST., Oct. 13, 1999, at A6. Apparently help for the gun industry is not on the
way.
10. For a discussion of economic, cause in fact and proximate cause policy
issues in suits against gun manufacturers, see infra notes 30-159 and accompanying
text.
11. See Butterfield, supra note 1, at A4 (noting that on November 12, 1998,
Chicago's mayor, Richard Daley, filed $433 million suit against 22 gun manufactur-
ers, 4 gun distributors and 12 suburban stores). The suit charged gun manufactur-
ers with creating a "public nuisance" by knowingly flooding the city with illegal
weapons. See id. (noting that city hopes lawsuits will reduce urban violence and
recover costs resulting from illegal gun sales).
12. See Swanson, supra note 1, at Al (noting allegation in Chicago suit that
manufacturers and distributors saturate suburban gun markets knowing that most
guns bought are brought into cities where handgun ownership is regulated). A
jury in a suit brought against handgun manufacturers in a New York federal court
returned a plaintiffs verdict under a similar market saturation theory. See id. (not-
ing jury's finding that 15 gun manufacturers were liable for $4 million in dam-
ages); see also Butterfield, supra note 1, at A4 (asserting that guns are creating
"excess" costs for Chicago's police, fire departments and public hospitals).
13. See Timothy Egan, Many Seek Security in Private Communities, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 1995, at A2 (noting that today, some of fastest growing communities in
country are private, gated communities often patrolled by numerous guards).
Nearly 4 million Americans live in gated communities. See Keith Bradsher, The
Vehicle for Upward Mobility, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at DI.
14. See Gottlieb & Willingham, supra note 1, at BI (noting that gun manufac-
turers are not using existing technology such as gun locks to limit violence).
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Fear, however, may be the largest cost of gun violence. 15 People are
afraid to travel through the core of many of our cities, to walk at night
without being escorted by the police and even to drive in our inner cit-
ies.1 6 This fear is triggered, in part, by gun-related violence.
The gun manufacturers suggest that the suits by the cities are misdi-
rected-that the key question is one of responsibility. 17 They argue that
everyone should be able to own a gun, that no gun control laws should be
passed and that no suits should intrude into the status quo of gun market-
ing. 18 Their rallying cry is that people who own guns should be responsi-
15. See Cynthia Tucker, Another Son Lost to Gun Violence, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,
Jan. 26, 1997, at B7 (noting that parents should be more worried about their chil-
dren dying as result of gun violence than worrying about them being killed in
automobile accidents). In 20 states in 1994, more Americans between the ages of
15 and 20 died due to gunfire than car wrecks. See id. (noting that gun violence
kills about 100 Americans daily). Overall, cars were only slightly more deadly that
year, killing 42,524 people compared to 38,505 people by gun fire. See id. (noting
that many lawmakers want stricter regulations on gun sales).
16. See Diane R. Stepp, School Watch Students Signing 'No-Guns' Pledge Safety Is-
sue: Parents of Many Middle School Pupils Will Get Copies of the Promise About Gun Safety
During Their Next Teacher Conference, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 15, 1998, at Cobb
Extra 4 (discussing articles by middle school student about gun violence). One
student from metropolitan Atlanta wrote about the experience of the child's
neighbor who was paralyzed from being shot six times in the back. See id. Another
student wrote about how students have to stay inside after school because of the
fear of guns. See id. (noting that both wealthy and poor children fear gun vio-
lence). Fear of guns can cause people to purchase even more guns. See Lisa Beth
Pulitzer, Women Bearing Firearms Increasing, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at L13 (not-
ing that most women who own guns cite fear as one reason for initial purchase).
Fear of rising crime, due largely to guns, is the most common reason why 15 to 20
million American women own guns today. See id. (noting rising crime rate as ma-
jor motivation for women who purchase guns).
17. SeeJeff DeBord, Editorial, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., June 12, 1998, at A18 (dis-
cussing theory that guns do not kill people, but rather people kill people). In
response to an article on. gun control, one Georgia resident wrote:
The shootings are a sad reminder of the moral decay in our society. They
have nothing to do with the availability of guns. Guns have been available
for a long time. I take full responsibility for my guns and my kids. The
last thing we need is another law to delegate that responsibility.
Id.
18. See id. (noting that gun manufacturers believe that gun owners should be
more responsible); see also Editorial, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 16, 1999, at A12
(arguing that trigger-puller, not firearm, is responsible for crime). The myth of
self-defense is shown by the fact that a member of the household with a gun in the
home is 43 more times likely to be shot than the intruder. See A.L. Kellerman &
D.T. Reay, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm-related Deaths in the Home, 314
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1559 (1986). John Lott has argued that the more guns,
the less crime. See generally John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence,
and Right-to-Cany Concealed Handguns, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997). Lott's theory was
shot down by Paul Rubin in Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Paul Rubin, Lives Saved or Lives
Lost: The Effects of Concealed Handgun Laws on Crime, 468 (Jan. 1998) (unpublished
manuscript, presented at American Economic Association meetings in Chicago).
550 [Vol. 44: p. 547
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ble citizens and lock their guns away from children.19 They argue that the
wrongful parties are the possessors and owners of guns; the gun manufac-
turers are merely disinterested third parties. 20 Gun owners ignore the fact
that they or a person in their home are forty-three more times likely to be
shot than an intruder.2 1
The responsibility that must be examined, however, is legal responsi-
bility. Our society has to ask what are the most serious problems plaguing
our communities. In making that inquiry, we soon reach the conclusion
that we have three converging and overlapping epidemics. 22 They are, in
19. See Joel Kilthau, Editoria4 ATLArTAJ. & CONST., Sept. 2, 1998, atAl4 (argu-
ing that increased responsibility will reduce gun violence). A recent letter to the
editor of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution is fairly representative of this view:
The bottom line with guns is responsibility: responsibility of the owners to
keep them out of the reach of children and to teach children (and
adults) what guns can do. It is a lack of responsibility that has led to this
era of gun-related violence and the proliferation of gun violence by and
against children. Gun safety is not about political endorsements, lobby-
ing groups or constitutional rights. It's about responsibility.
Id.
20. See Case Against Gun Industry Will Be Hard to Prove, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 28,
1999, at A22 (noting that recklessness of gun owners is unforeseen superceding
cause of violence).
21. See Kellerman & Reay, supra note 18, at 1559.
22. See S. 2047, 100th Cong. § (a) (2) (1988) (noting that tobacco, alcohol
and guns affect our society in concert). Approximately one-half of all accidental
deaths, suicides and homicides are alcohol-related. See id. (noting that alcohol
substantially increased risk of suicide); H.R. 4441, 100th Cong. § 1(9) (1988) (not-
ing that alcohol is most commonly used drug by American youth); see also Kates, et
al., supra note 1, at 584 (noting that men who kill their domestic partners are
prone to alcohol abuse).
19991
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order of severity, tobacco, alcohol and guns. 23 This Article will examine
the question of legal responsibility for gun-related violence.
24
The responsibility of the gun manufacturers is the cornerstone of
these recent suits brought by American cities. The cities are asking the
manufacturers to take responsibility for the marketing of their products.
The recent tort suits raise three important issues that are addressed in
Sections II, III and IV of this Article: Section II addresses economic analy-
sis; 2 5 Section III addresses cause in fact;2 6 and Section IV addresses proxi-
mate cause. 27 Additionally, Section V discusses the potential viability of
products liability claims against gun manufacturers. 28 Finally, Sections VI
and VII of this Article assess the role of courts in these revolutionary law-
suits and suggests the traditional methods upon which they should be
evaluated.
29
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Because of the insulation of the gun industry, the costs of dealing with
gun violence have been shifted from the government to private and corpo-
23. For a discussion on tobacco and alcohol, see Raymond E. Gangarosa et
al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditure for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and
Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 82 (1994) (noting
that smoking inhibits hospitals from preventing disease and promoting efficiency).
Each year smoking kills 350,000 people. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Env't of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 4 (1986) (noting that
90% of smokers start before end of their teenage years); see also ELIZABETH M.
WHELAN, A SMOKING GUN: HOW THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY GETS AWAY WITH MURDER
10 (1984) (noting that 17.7 million people over age 18 suffer from negative effects
of alcohol). In 1988, the House of Representatives reported that almost 24,000
Americans die each year in traffic accidents as a result of alcohol consumption. See
H.R. 4441, 100th Cong. § 1(3) (noting that, in United States, alcohol-related traf-
fic accidents produce more than 23,987 deaths per year); see alsoJanice Somerville,
Gun Control as Immunization, AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 3, 1994, at 9 (quoting CDC offi-
cial as stating "Guns are a virus that must be eradicated. We need to immunize
ourselves against them... [g] et rid of the guns, get rid of the bullets, and you get
rid of the deaths."). Between 1979 and 1987, criminal offenders used handguns to
kill an average of 9,200 Americans each year and wound 15,000 others. See Nyla R.
Branscombe & Susan Owen, Influence of Gun Ownership on Social Inferences About
Women and Men, 21 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1567, 1584 (1991) (noting that
men cause majority of gun related violence). Additionally, during the same time
period, 1,200 people died yearly from handgun accidents. See id. Recent studies
put the numbers of deaths per year due to guns at over 35,000. See Tucker, supra
note 15, at B7 (noting that car accidents and gun violence produce similar
amounts of deaths each year).
24. For a discussion of the question of legal responsibility for gun-related vio-
lence, see infra notes 30-159 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of economic analysis, see infra notes 30-60.
26. For a discussion of cause in fact, see infra notes 61-87.
27. For a discussion of proximate cause, see infra notes 88-159.
28. For a discussion of the design defect theory of suit, see infra notes 160-67
and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the role of courts and the basic nature of damages suits
against gun manufacturers, see infra notes 168-200 and accompanying text.
552 [Vol. 44: p. 547
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rate taxpayers. High taxes have made it more expensive to live in cities
and more costly to run a business. 30 These recent suits against gun manu-
facturers argue that the costs of gun violence should shift from the cities
to the manufacturers of the guns and then to the purchasers of guns.31 In
economic terms, the cities are asking the gun manufacturers to internalize
the costs of gun violence.3 2 This was done with the steel industry when the
costs of air and water pollution were placed on steel manufacturers. 33
Consequently, the price of steel increased to reflect those costs.3 4
Once the cost of gun violence is placed on gun manufacturers, several
things may happen. It is not inevitable that if the municipalities are suc-
cessful, gun manufacturers will immediately file for bankruptcy or de-
crease the number of guns on the street. The potential occurrences
follow:
1. Nothing may happen. The loss brought on by the cities' suits may be
absorbed by the manufacturers. This is often true in automobile litiga-
tion. Ordinarily, there will not be immediate increases in the prices of the
automobile even though the car manufacturer was recently sued. 35
30. SeeJulie B. Hairston, Atlanta Officials at Odds Over Next Cuts in Budget, Re-
duction Revenues Pinches City, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Oct. 12, 1998, at B4 (suggesting
that less migration to suburbs would improve city services and lower taxes). In a
good number of urban centers, many middle class taxpayers, who make up the
bulk of the tax base, have left for suburban neighborhoods. See id. This has caused
cities to raise tax rates to pay for city services. See id. (noting that cities must also
reduce their proposed budgets). During the 1980s, taxes in Atlanta were 40%
higher than in other parts of Fulton County, Georgia. See Tom Teepen, City Must
Look To Its Tax Future, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Dec. 27, 1986, at AO. Taxes in Fulton
County were nearly double those of neighboring Cobb County. See id. (noting that
Atlanta's basic services were nearly identical to those of Cobb County).
31. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in Assessment of Damages, 39
J.L. & ECON. 191, 192 (1996) (noting that gun manufacturers and owners often
bear cost of social harm caused by guns); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 428 (1994) (noting that tort and contract claims are usually
based on harm to injured party).
32. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 31, at 428 (arguing that liability should
be based on profit of gun manufacturers and not harm to victim).
33. SeeJohn W. Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liabil-
ity and Environmental Liability, 14 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 225, 227 (1995) (noting that single
toxic waste cleanup costs steel industry approximately $20 million). See generally
Bove v. Donner Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (App. Div. 1932) (noting that
courts can use public nuisance laws to control pollution).
34. Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade,
100 HARv. L. REv. 546, 606 (1987) (noting that increase in environmental regula-
tions forced U.S. Steel Industry to demand higher tariffs on foreign imports to
maintain competitiveness).
35. See FrankJ. Vandall, Criminal Prosecution of Corporations for Defective Products,
12 INT'L LEGAL PRAc. 66, 68 (Sept. 1987) (noting that punitive damages are rarely
awarded against car manufacturers and, when they are, they are often small); see
also Gary Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1013, 1060
(1991) (noting that cost of Ford Pinto increased by only $10 after its redesign
following litigation).
1999] 553
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2. The price of the specific gun may increase to reflect the damage it causes.
The gun manufacturer may analyze what portion of the judgment is due
to a specific gun and increase the price of that gun accordingly. 36 Follow-
ing the recent tobacco settlement, for example, the price of a pack of
cigarettes increased forty-five cents. 37 Tobacco products are, nevertheless,
still available. Furthermore, price increases caused by product litigation
alert the consumer to potentially unsafe products. 38 As a result, consum-
ers purchase fewer high-priced products. 3 9 This, in turn, encourages the
manufacturer to produce safer products.
3. The particular gun may be redesigned. The gun manufacturer may
incorporate a computer chip in the stock of the gun so that it can only be
fired by someone with a matching computer chip.40 There may be combi-
nation locks placed on the gun so that no one can use the gun without
knowing the combination. 4 1 The gun may be changed from an automatic
to a single shot weapon and, any attempt to change it back, will make the
gun unusable. Similar techniques are used on ATM's that destroy un-
36. See Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d 1143, 1153-54 (Md. 1985) (noting
that increase in price of Saturday Night Special would improve its safety and
accuracy).
37. See Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers Announce Large Price Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 1998, at A] (reporting that due to settlement, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company were both raising cigarette prices 45 cents per package); see also
Cigarette Prices Rise Sharply in Wake of States' Tobacco Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,
1998, at A5 (noting tobacco analyst statement that reason for price increase was "to
fund the settlement payment").
38. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 421-62 (1988)
(analyzing modern products liability law from economic standpoint). Where a
manufacturer is required to compensate parties injured by its defective products,
the manufacturer will foresee losses likely to be incurred due to those products.
See id. (noting that risk of suit against tobacco companies causes increase in ciga-
rette prices). Therefore, the cost of such foreseeable losses will be included in the
price of those products, and act as an implicit insurance policy. See id. (predicting
that national average price of cigarettes would increase nearly 26% due to large
tobacco settlement).
39. See RovJ. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcS 50-
52 (5th ed. 1993) (noting basic economic principle that there will be fewer pur-
chasers of goods at higher price than if that good was sold at lower price).
40. See Kit R. Roane, The Latest in Safety: 'Smart' Guns that Know Their Owners,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, at N.J. 1 (describing some recent technological develop-
ments in gun manufacturing).
41. See James Bennet, Gun Makers Agree on Safety Locks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1997, at A3 (noting that technology can prevent thieves from stealing guns and
using them in crimes). In 1997, the Clinton Administration reached an agreement
with a number of gun manufacturers requiring new handguns to be manufactured
with child-safety locks. See id. (noting that gun locks would decrease number of
accidental deaths cause by guns). The agreement, however, covered about 80% of
the new handgun market. See id. This agreement did nothing to increase the
safety of those weapons already in circulation. See id. (noting that older guns are
responsible for majority of deaths).
[Vol. 44: p. 547
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funded credit cards. Producing safer guns appears no more technologi-
cally challenging than producing voracious ATM machines. 4 2
4. The specific gun may be withdrawn from the market. Likely candidates
for such an approach include the Saturday Night Special and automatic
weapons. 4 3 A manufacturer may discontinue the Saturday Night Special
because the guns are responsible for a large amount of violent acts and
monetary loss to the cities. By way of example, the Ford Pinto had a ten-
dency to explode when hit in the trunk.4 4 Consequently, the Pinto was
redesigned and later withdrawn from the market. As a further example,
automatic rifles are now banned. 4 5 Although new automatic rifles cannot
be purchased in the United States they can still be obtained from individu-
als. 46 For that reason, the ban is largely meaningless.
5. Small gun manufacturers who cause large amounts of damage may file for
bankruptcy. Manufacturers sometimes choose bankruptcy when liabilities
exceed assets. 47 Some critics have argued that numerous bankruptcies
may decrease the number of guns in the American society. 48 Such an out-
come, however, remains unlikely because guns would continue to be man-
ufactured by the government for the police and the military. Defense
contractors will continue to produce firearms for the military under gov-
ernment contracts just as they do today. Hunters may be able to request
42. For a further discussion of the role of courts and the basic nature of dam-
age suits against gun manufacturers, see infra notes 168-200 and accompanying
text.
43. See Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d 1143, 1153-54 (Md. 1985) (discuss-
ing derivation of term Saturday Night Special). The Saturday Night Special is a
small handgun that is cheap, easily concealed and extremely unreliable. See id. at
1154 (noting that Saturday Night Special is constructed of poor quality material).
Gun salespeople have been quoted as describing their Saturday Night Specials as
"ghetto guns." See id. A salesman for R.G. Industries, describing a handgun he was
selling, said to a retailer, "If your store is anywhere near a ghetto area, these ought
to sell real well. This is most assuredly a ghetto gun." Id. at 1158. In October,
1999, Colt abandoned most of its 144-year-old retail gun business. See Tom
Teepen, Lawsuits Substitute for Decent Gun Policy, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 19,
1999, at A19.
44. See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1019 (noting that prior to discontinuing
Pinto, Ford redesigned it by adding $11 plastic sheet to protect its gas tank from
rupturing on impact).
45. See Correction, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1990, at A2 (noting that federal law
banned all automatic weapons manufactured after 1986). Some state laws ban all
automatic weapons regardless of date of manufacture. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 265.10 (McKinney 1998) (criminalizing manufacture of machine guns).
46. See Violence Policy Center Hails Clinton's Call to Regulate Gun Shows, U.S. NEW-
swIRE, Nov. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13607302 (noting that all types of guns
can be purchased at gun shows).
47. See ELIZABETH WARREN &JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 470-71 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that businesses faced with large debts
will often choose to reorganize under Chapter 11 of Bankruptcy Code to prevent
having to liquidate their assets).
48. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRuIrcv § 10-2 (1993) (noting that small
and medium-sized debtors reorganizing under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
often fail to have plan confirmed and therefore must be liquidated).
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special permits for rifles, but this would still keep handguns out of circula-
tion. 49 In response to those who argue that the gun manufacturers will go
bankrupt if sued, no cigarette manufacturer has gone bankrupt in spite of
having agreed to pay out $206 billion over twenty-five years. 50 The Pinto
debacle, as mentioned above, did not drive Ford into bankruptcy. 51 Con-
ceivably though, if there are fewer manufacturers producing guns, there
may be fewer guns produced.
6. The gun manufacturers will likely spend more money on lobbying the state
and federal legislatures for special legislative protection. Gun manufacturers may
seek to have Congress adopt protective laws just as tobacco companies
have with cigarettes. For example, gun manufacturers may ask the courts
for a prohibition against suits brought by the cities because of a failure to
warn.5 2 The gun manufacturers may lobby Congress to adopt a bill that
would prohibit any liability against them for Saturday Night Specials, zip
guns or uzzis. An example of this is the Georgia legislature who just
passed legislation forbidding municipal suits against gun manufacturers.
5 3
Additionally, Congressman Barr has threatened to introduce similar legis-
lation before Congress. 54
7. There would probably be a flood of media ads by the gun manufacturers,
such as the recent ones by the cigarette companies, proclaiming that they are being
treated unfairly by the courts, and suggesting that guns are similar in utility to
knives or automobiles.5 5 To be sure, the flood of tobacco ads may have
49. See David B. Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of Assault Weapon Prohibition, 20J.
CONrEMP. L. 381, 414 (1994) (noting that there would be no ban on big game
hunting rifles because they are responsible for less than one percent of gun related
homicides).
50. See Barry Meier, Remaining States Approve The Pact On Tobacco Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, at A5 (reporting that every state except Florida, Minnesota,
Mississippi and Texas and five U.S. territories agreed to settle their suits against
tobacco companies for $206 billion paid over 25 years).
51. See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1013 (discussing Ford's liability in wrongful
death suit brought by owners of Pinto).
52. See, e.g., Gunmakers'First Volley In War On Suits: State Lends Its Support, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 9, 1999, at 6 (noting that gun lobbyists are currently pushing similar
measures through many state legislatures). The Georgia legislature, for example,
passed a measure prohibiting any pending and future litigation by its cities against
handgun manufacturers. See id. (stating that state bill would quash all pending
and future gun litigation by Georgia's cities).
53. See Kathey Pruitt, Blocking of Gun Suit Now Law, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb.
10, 1999, at BI (reporting that Governor Roy Barnes signed into law bill blocking
city of Atlanta's lawsuit against gun manufacturers that brings end to legislative
battle over right of any local government to bring product liability suit against gun
manufacturers).
54. See Bruce Alpert, Morial Targets Guns on Washington Trip, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Mar. 25, 1999, at A19 (reporting that Representative Bob Barr ( R-Ga.) plans to
introduce legislation that would ban cities and states from filing lawsuits against
gun manufacturers for gun violence).
55. See Ruth Marcus, Big Tobacco Quietly Tries to Grow Grass Roots; Industy's So-
phisticated Lobbying Tactics Strike Some Critics as Deceptive, WASH. POST, May 16, 1998,
at Al (noting that tobacco companies such as Brown & Williamson circulated
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helped to doom the $368.5 billion settlement.56 If the cities win and the
gun manufacturers are held liable, the next step is up to the manufactur-
ers. It is important to keep in mind that a civil judgment is not the
equivalent to a ban on guns; rather it merely requires the payment of dam-
ages. 57 A manufacturer who has lost a products liability suit may continue
to produce the product.
8. There may be increased federal regulation over guns. An example of this
tighter control over guns is the Brady Bill.58 A recent report indicated
that it has been very effective in reducing sales to criminals.5 9 Another
report states that because of the Brady Bill, thousands of felons each year
are unable to purchase a gun. 60
III. CAUSE IN FACT
Cause in fact in a tort suit for damages is a matter of science. 6 1 The
question is whether, as a matter of science, the defendant's conduct had
something to do with the plaintiff's injury. For example, the plaintiff must
show that the gun manufacturer had something to do with the loss of life
and that the manufacturer precipitated the need to hire additional police.
There are two tests for cause in fact: the "but for" test and the "substantial
factor" test.62 "But for" causation may fail when there are two concurrent
thousands of petitions and sent postcards to voters urging them to write their Con-
gressmen opposing tobacco settlement).
56. See id. (noting that National Smokers Alliance supported 60-second radio
spots asking why consumers should pay $500 billion in new taxes because of to-
bacco settlement).
57. See Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 203 (E.D. La. 1983)
(noting that if manufacturer is found liable, it may still produce handguns and
pass costs of unfavorable judgment onto purchasers in form of higher prices), rev'd
sub nom. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
58. See White House Press Paper: Keeping Guns Out of the Hands of Criminals, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, June 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 4636812 (reporting that Brady Bill
blocked 400,000 gun sales).
59. See id. (reporting that 66.3% of denials were because of purchaser's crimi-
nal record).
60. See R. Robin McDonald, Brady Law Daily Stops 6 Gun Buys; Results Hailed; A
U.S. Attorney Says the Curb on Quick Weapon Sales is Preventing Crime in Georgia, AT-
LANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 28, 1995, at Cl (noting that in its first year, Brady Bill
stopped 2,362 felons from purchasing handguns in Georgia according to Georgia
Crime Information Center).
61. See Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, Pt. 1, 28 TEX. L.
REv. 471, 476 (1950) (stating that issue of causal relations requires scientific in-
quiry of facts); see also Frank J. Vandall, Duty: The Continuing Vitality of Dean Green's
Theory, 15 QUINNIPiAC L. REv. 343, 344 (1995) (stating that cause in fact exists
when defendant's conduct had something to do with plaintiffs injury as matter of
science).
62. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 41 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining two texts of causation); see also Gilman v. Noyes, 57
N.H. 627, 631 (1876) (using "but for" test to determine cause in fact); Schultz v.
Brogan, 29 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Wis. 1947) (discussing use of substantial factor test
for cause in fact).
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causes that bring about an event.63 This often occurs in product cases,
and for this reason, the substantial factor test is more often used. 6 4 Under
the substantial factor test, the court would seek to determine whether the
defendant's conduct (selling a defective gun) was a substantial factor in
causing the plaintiffs injury.
There are serious issues in reference to a cause in fact analysis in both
tobacco suits and suits against gun manufacturers. In tobacco cases, it may
be difficult for the parties to identify every type of cigarette a plaintiff
smoked. Similarly, in firearms cases, it will be difficult to show which
weapons actually caused the harm inflicted. This is because the weapons
used to perpetrate crimes are often never recovered. 65
With individual suits brought by smokers suffering from cancer, the
issue of fact before the court is often whether the individual smoker con-
sumed only Marlboros or did they also smoke Luckies and Camels? Of
course a smoker would have smoked several different brands over the pe-
riod of their life. This creates a substantial cause in fact problem for indi-
vidual smokers, and it also raises cause in fact issues in the later suits by the
states against the manufacturers of tobacco. For example, how do you
prove the amount each smoker consumed of each brand of cigarettes? No
records are available to answer that question, and the depositions of the
smokers or hospital officials are inconclusive. There is also the cause in
fact question of whether the plaintiff's cancer was actually caused by smok-
ing. It is possible that environmental factors or genetic factors were the
cause in fact. 6 6 Fortunately, the law has evolved to respond to the difficul-
ties of proving these challenging cause in fact suggestions.
Perhaps the most important case dealing with complex cause in fact
issues is a California Supreme Court case, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.67 In
Sindel4 a twenty-year-old woman developed vaginal cancer because her
mother had taken DES to prevent a miscarriage while the daughter was in
utero.68 The allegation was that the DES caused the daughter's vaginal
cancer twenty years later. 69 The cause in fact issue was that the mother
could not remember what brand of DES she consumed and the doctor did
63. SeeJeffery Neher v. II Marrow Inc., No. 97-35068, 1998 WL 340087, *1
(9th Cir. May 8, 1998) (holding district court erred when they applied "but for"
test for proximate cause rather than substantial factor test in products liability
case).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Bounds v. Delo, 151 F.3d 1116, 1117 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating mur-
der weapon was never recovered); United States v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 271 (3d Cir.
1998) (stating gun used in carjacking was never recovered); United States v. Wil-
liams, 95 F.3d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining police never recovered weapon
used in murder).
66. For a discussion of causation issues, see supra notes 30-65 and infra notes
67-159 and accompanying text.
67. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
68. See id. at 925.
69. See id. at 925-26.
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not keep records of the brand of DES he prescribed for the mother. 70
Therefore, the plaintiff-daughter could not show which DES manufacturer
was the cause in fact of her cancer.
7 1
The court resolved the issue by allowing the plaintiff to sue a majority
of the manufacturers of DES, holding each of the defendants liable in
proportion to the amount of their sales.72 For example, if a manufacturer
had sold thirty-three percent of the DES, and over fifty percent of the
manufacturers were joined, it would be liable for thirty-three percent of
the plaintiff's damages. 73 In a later New York case, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co.,7 4 the court did not restrict the defendants to those who had only man-
ufactured and sold DES in the state of New York, and the court allowed
the plaintiff to recover the full amount of her damages, not a percentage
as was true in Sindell.
75
However, in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,76 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
allowed the defendant, the DES manufacturer, to avoidjoinder in the suit,
if the defendant could show that there was a distinguishing characteristic
in the pill sold by the defendant. 77 For example, if the defendant sold
blue pills and the mother had only taken red pills, then the manufacturer
of the blue pills could avoid joinder.78 The point of these DES cases was
that the plaintiff, although unable to identify the manufacturer of the
70. See id. at 926.
71. See id. at 925-28.
72. See id. at 937 (holding that "[e]ach defendant will be held liable for the
proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it dem-
onstrates that it could not have made the product which caused plaintiffs
injuries").
73. See id. (citing Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FoRmiAm L. Riv. 963, 997 (1978), and explaining connection between percentage
of market share and liability).
74. 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (using national market to determine
liability).
75. See id. (adopting market share theory using national market). The court
refused to allow a defendant to escape the suit by showing that it was not selling
DES at the time the plaintiffs mother consumed it. See id. (noting potential for
defendant windfall). The New York Court of Appeals held the following:
[B]ecause liability here is based on the over-all risk produced, and not
causation in a single case, there should be no exculpation of a defendant
who, although a member of the market producing DES for pregnancy
use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff's injury. It is merely
a windfall for a producer to escape liability solely because it manufac-
tured a more identifiable pill ....
Id.
76. 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).
77. See id. at 50 (holding that at trial, plaintiff must establish, by preponder-
ance of evidence, that defendant produced or marketed type of pill that her
mother took by reference to pills' color, shape, markings, size or other identifiable
characteristics).
78. See id. at 52 (stating that defendant, in order to avoid liability, must prove
by preponderance of evidence that it did not produce or market type of DES to
which plaintiff was exposed).
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specific DES that the plaintiff had taken, was still able to recover from
hundreds of defendants. 79 These DES cases are likely to become impor-
tant precedents in the new wave of gun litigation because it is unlikely that
the cities will be able to identify the brand of gun that was used in each
shooting and thus will have to rely on the market share analysis developed
in the DES cases.
The tobacco litigation by the states handled the thorny issue of cause
in fact with statistics. 80 In suits by individuals, it is possible to argue that
there may be other causes of the cancer besides the tobacco smoked by
the individual. 81 Things such as genetics and environment may play a part
in causing cancer in a particular person. But the suits by the states repre-
sent hundreds of thousands of victims, and the larger the class of individu-
als, the more accurate the statistical proof of cause in fact. 82 It is possible
to argue that, if twenty percent of smokers develop lung cancer, then in a
state suit for damages, it is possible to be very accurate in saying that
twenty percent of the smokers represented by the suit developed lung can-
cer from smoking.8 3 The point is that the larger the group of victims the
more reliable the statistics are in showing what in fact caused the damages.
The rule in the Sindell case will also be helpful in gun litigation. 84
Applying the Sindell rule, the gun manufacturers will likely be held liable
in proportion to their sales. If Glock, for example, sold twenty-five per-
cent of the guns in Chicago from 1994 through 1999, then Glock will
likely be liable for twenty-five percent of the Chicago loss, unless they can
prove otherwise. Based upon the Sindell rule, Glock will be able to join
Remington and Winchester to show that they sold ten percent and five
percent of the guns respectively, and therefore Glock will not be liable for
the fifteen percent represented by the sales of Remington and
79. See id. at 44 (noting that as many as 300 drug companies produced or
marketed DES throughout nearly 24 years of DES sales).
80. See Jonathan S. Massey, The Florida Tobacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objec-
tions to a Reasonable Solution to Florida's Medicaid Crisis, 46 FLA. L. REv. 591, 605
(1994) (reporting that FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9) (Supp. 1994) now allows use of
statistical evidence to prove causation).
81. See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating The Costs of Smoking: The Application of
Absolute Liability To Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 429-30 (1991)
(highlighting problems faced by individual plaintiffs who bring suits against to-
bacco companies).
82. See generally NOEL A. C. CRESSIE, STATISTICS FOR SPATIAL DATA (1993) (dis-
cussing various ways to analyze spatial data); PAUL NEWBOLD, STATISTICS FOR Busi-
NESS AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 1995) (analyzing use of statistics and their methods).
83. See Massey, supra note 80, at 602-03 (discussing purpose for recent amend-
ments to FLA. STAT. § 409.910 (Supp. 1994)).
84. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980) (not-
ing problems experienced by plaintiffs when they tried to identify individual DES
suppliers). In the cities' cases against the gun manufacturers, it will be difficult to
determine exactly which and how much, each companies' guns contributed to the
damages the cities have experienced. A market share liability theory would make
recovery much easier.
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Winchester.8 5 Each gun manufacturer will be liable in proportion to their
sales.8 6 This is a preliminary analysis. At trial, the defense will likely argue
the distinctions between collector-model, over-under shotguns that are not
likely responsible for much loss to the cities, and Saturday Night Specials
that are more likely to be responsible for a great deal of the loss. The
manufacturers of the over-unders will be dismissed from suit and the man-
ufacturers of Saturday Night Specials will be held liable.8
7
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate cause is a matter of policy; it is not a question of fact.88
Proximate cause was created by the judiciary in order to control juries and
to limit the scope of liability.8 9 It is often said that proximate cause exists
because there must be a line drawn somewhere.90
There are two fundamental approaches to proximate cause: (1) the
rule approach;91 and (2) the duty approach. 92 Under the rule approach,
the court has to struggle to find a rule for proximate cause that will answer
policy issues in all cases. Over the years, several rules for proximate cause
have developed. One is the directness test, that holds the defendant liable
85. See id. at 937-38 (noting that under Sindell rule, manufacturer is only re-
sponsible for its share of market and is not held liable for any amount in excess of
its market share).
86. See id. ("Under this approach, each manufacturer's liability would approx-
imate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products.").
87. See Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1332 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (dis-
missing numerous gun manufacturers from suit).
88. See Vandall, supra 61, at 343-44 (stating that proximate cause is strictly
policy question); see also Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, Pt. III,
28 TEX. L. REv. 755, 757 (1950) (discussing effects of policy on proximate cause).
89. See FRANKJ. VANDALL, STRICT LtABILrr: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 45
(1989) (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 244-45 (4th ed.
1971)) (stating term proximate cause is applied by courts to limit liability when
cause has been established).
90. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, at 261 (stating that "[s]ome boundary
must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some
social idea of justice or policy").
91. See In re Polemis and Furness, Wilthy and Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 565-68
(Eng. C.A. 1921) (using rule approach to determine breach of duty). Under the
rule approach, liability can be solved with a rule, whereby a party need only use the
correct rule. See Vandall, supra note 61, at 343-45 (discussing scope of liability
question). Foreseeability is used to answer almost every question in the traditional
negligence formula under the rule approach. See id. at 344. The traditional negli-
gence formula requires answering questions of duty, breach of duty, cause in fact,
proximate cause and damages. See id. at 343 (stating study of proximate cause
begins with five elements). Under the rule approach, the only element in the
traditional negligence formula not influenced by foreseeability is cause in fact. See
id. at 345 (discussing forseeability in traditional negligence formula).
92. See Green, supra note 61, at 475-80 (noting Dean Green approach that
focuses on whether there is duty of defendant to particular plaintiff for particular
injury); see also Vandall, supra note 61, at 349 (applying Dean Green's duty analysis
to several well known proximate cause cases).
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for all injuries that flow directly from the defendant's negligent conduct.9 3
The second test assesses foreseeability and it holds that a defendant should
only be liable for results of their negligent conduct when the defendant
foresaw the results.9 4 The third test is the foreseeable small risk test,
which holds that the actor can be held liable when there is a foreseeable
small risk of the injury occurring.9 5 The fourth test is the foreseeable
plaintiff or zone of danger test as articulated in the famous case of Palsgraf
v. Long Island R R Co.9 6 In Palsgraf Judge Cardozo held that a plaintiff
could only recover if the defendant's action created a foreseeable risk to
the plaintiff.9 7 If the risk of harm caused by the defendant's action was
not foreseeable to the plaintiff, then the negligent conduct of the defend-
ant would not extend to the plaintiff.98 A later formulation of the Palsgraf
rule is the zone of danger test, which says that only persons within the
zone of danger created by the defendant may recover from the negligent
actor.9 9 That is, if the plaintiff is outside the zone of danger, then the
plaintiff cannot recover under the Palsgraf rule.10 0 Municipalities will ar-
gue that gun manufacturers were the proximate cause of the cities' losses
because they were: (i) direct; (ii) foreseeable; (iii) a foreseeably small risk;
(iv) the plaintiffs (the cities) were foreseeable; and (v) the cities were
within the zone of danger. The judge and the jury apparently accepted
the above arguments in the 1999 New York decision of Hamilton v. Accu-
tek. 10 1
93. See In re Polemis, 3 KB. at 564 (holding that defendant is liable for dam-
ages that are direct result of defendant's conduct).
94. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd.,
[1961] 1 App. Cas. 388, 393 (J.C. 1961) (appeal taken from New South Wales)
[hereinafter Wagon Mound 1] (stating that test for determining liability was
foreseeability).
95. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co., [1967] 1 App.
Cas. 617, 629-31 (P.C. 1966) (appeal taken from New South Wales) [hereinafter
Wagon Mound II] (stating defendant is liable if there was foreseeable small risk of
injury).
96. 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). This case states that for plaintiff to recover,
a plaintiff must show an act that caused harm was a foreseeable risk of harm to the
plaintiff. See generally id.
97. See id. at 100-01 (stating that plaintiff must show act may have created
readily apparent danger so as to entitle plaintiff to be protected against harm by
law).
98. See id. (stating that without foreseeable act to plaintiff, plaintiff cannot
recover for negligent act of defendant).
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. c (1964) (stating that if
plaintiff is within given area of danger, plaintiff may recover for injuries caused by
defendant's actions).
100. See id. (stating that if plaintiff is outside given zone of danger, plaintiff
cannot recover).
101. 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). For a discussion of Hamilton v. Accu-
tek, see infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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Proximate cause is often boiled down to the test of foreseeability and
the critical issue of intervening cause. 10 2 An intervening cause is one that
comes from a source other than the defendant and occurs after the de-
fendant's negligent conduct.'0 3 Further, an intervening cause is merely a
later cause from another source, but a superseding cause is one that severs
the first defendant's liability.1 0 4 For example, if a defendant negligently
runs its train into a truck stopped on the railroad track and thieves steal
the melons that were thrown out of the truck after the collision, the court
would find that the thieves caused the loss of the melons rather than the
railroad.10 5 The act of the thieves severed the liability of the railroad. Us-
ing such an argument, gun manufacturers will contend that the conduct
of the criminal in shooting the gun, supersedes their saturation selling or
marketing of a defectively designed gun.
One of the most famous intervening cause cases involved a tank car
filled with gasoline that, because of the negligence of the railroadjumped
the track, split open and spewed gasoline onto the city streets. 10 6 A per-
son ignited the gasoline causing great damage to the city.10 7 The court
held that even if the person was negligent in lighting a cigar, the railroad
remained liable because the negligent intervening cause did not sever the
liability of the initial negligent actor, the railroad.' 0 8 The court, however,
went on to say that if the intervening actor intentionally lit the gasoline
vapors, then the railroad would not be liable because they could not fore-
see criminality. 10 9 In other words, the railroad had no way of anticipating
102. See Vandall, supra note 61, at 343 (noting Dean Green's position that
intervening cause is subclass of duty and mere question of policy). Intervening
cause should be subsumed under the duty analysis. See id. at 346 (stating insights
of Dean Green).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1964) (defining intervening
cause in terms of "intervening force" as "one which actively operates in producing
harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed");
see also James Angell McLauglin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REv. 149, 159-60
(1925) (defining intervening force as "a force which is neither operating in the
defendant's presence, nor at the place where the defendant's act takes effect at the
time of the defendant's act, but comes into effective operation at or before the
time of the damage").
104. See KEETON ET AL. supra note 62, at 301 (discussing how terminology
came about and expounding on interplay between intervening and superseding
causes).
105. See id. at 301-02 (providing general discussion of intervening causes).
106. See Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co., 126 S.W. 146, 147
(Ky. 1910) (stating appellee's tank car was derailed thereby spilling gasoline onto
streets).
107. See id. (stating that explosion resulted when person threw lighted match
used to ignite cigar onto gasoline covered street).
108. See id. at 150-51 (quoting Louisville Home Tel. Co. v. Gasper, 93 S.W. 1057,
1059 (Ky. 1906), "[iut is well settled that the mere fact that there have been inter-
vening causes between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injuries is not
sufficient in law to relieve the former from liability . . . ").
109. See id. at 151 (stating that if act of lighting match and throwing it was
malicious, railroad would not be responsible).
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that someone would intentionally light the gasoline on fire. 110 Hence, the
criminal intervening cause of lighting the match would supersede the neg-
ligence of the railroad."1
Other cases have held that a criminal intervening cause may be fore-
seeable and, if so, the initial negligent actor should be held liable. For
example, in Richardson v. Ham,112 the owners of a bulldozer left it un-
locked and parked it at the top of a hill. 113 Some boys came along, started
the bulldozer, drove it down the hill and crashed it into the plaintiff's
house.'1 4 The court held that because it was foreseeable that young peo-
ple would climb on the bulldozer, their criminal conduct in starting the
bulldozer and driving it down the hill was not a superseding cause.
1 15
Similarly, in Hergenrether v. East,'1 6 the defendants left a pickup truck,
filled with valuable plumbing supplies, in a densely populated neighbor-
hood overnight.1 17 During the night, thieves stole the truck and crashed
it into the plaintiffs car.'1 8 The court held that the conduct of the thieves
was foreseeable because of the nature of the neighborhood and the valua-
ble material left in the pickup truck.119 The driver of the pickup truck was
held liable for failing to take the keys out of the ignition, and the criminal
act, in this case the theft, did not supersede his liability.1 20
In many jurisdictions, there are statutes that require vehicle owners to
remove the keys from the ignition.' 2 ' Some courts, when interpreting
110. See id.
111. See id. (holding railroad was not "bound to anticipate the criminal acts of
others by which damage is inflicted and [would not be] liable therefor").
112. 285 P.2d 269 (Cal. 1955).
113. See id. at 270.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 272 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 449 (1934), "If the real-
izable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard
... which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent,
intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for
harm caused thereby.").
116. 393 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1964).
117. See id. at 165 (stating that defendant who was driving left door to truck
unlocked and keys to vehicle in ignition).
118. See id. (providing that thief crossed center dividing line of highway and
collided head on with vehicle in which plaintiffs were riding).
119. See id. at 167 (listing factors contributing to foreseeability).
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1975 (West 1998) (noting prohibition on
idling personal automobiles). The statute provides:
No person driving or in charge of any motor vehicle except a licensed
delivery truck or other delivery vehicle while making deliveries, shall per-
mit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the
ignition, and removing the key. No vehicle shall be permitted to stand
unattended upon any perceptible grade without stopping the engine and
effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the
curb or side of the street.
Id.; see ALA. CODE § 32-5A-50 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-51-1306 (Michie 1994);
CoLo. Rv. STAT. § 42-4-1206 (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4182 (1995); HAw.
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these statutes, have held that, because theft is foreseeable, failure to take
the keys out of the vehicle makes the owner of the vehicle liable when a
thief steals the vehicle and crashes it into a third party.12 2 Although there
is initial liability, courts have held that after a certain amount of time has
passed, the responsibility of the owner for their negligence terminates and
the owner can no longer be held liable for injuries to third parties. 123
Superseding cause may be an issue in suits against gun manufacturers.
Cities will argue that gun manufacturers know the guns are being sold in
large numbers, which are reaching communities where guns are banned.
Therefore, the manufacturers of guns should be held liable for the effects
of the foreseeable saturation of guns. Additionally, courts may hold the
manufacturers responsible for their gun ads, finding that they facilitate
the sale of guns beyond the intended markets (e.g., guns purchased in the
South and resold in New York City), where they are illegal and being used
in criminal activities.
In cases like those mentioned above, it is possible for courts to hold
that because the distribution and criminal use of the guns was foreseeable,
the manufacturers should be held liable. Furthermore, merely because
the end use was criminal, it should not sever the liability of the gun manu-
facturers. The criminal result was foreseeable and, therefore, the inter-
vening criminal act did not supersede the manufacturers' negligence.
Superseding cause will not be a strong defense for the gun manufac-
turers in the suits by municipalities. In suits brought by individual plain-
tiffs, superseding cause may carry the day as it did in Richmond v. Charter
Arms. 124 Superseding cause should not be a valid defense in municipal
REv. STAT. § 291C-121 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 49-602 (1994); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-1401 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1573 (1991); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 189.430 (Michie 1997); MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. II § 21-1101 (1999); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 13 (West 1999); MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-3-909 (1972); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 60-6, 168 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-353 (Michie 1998); OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 4511.66.1 (Anderson 1997); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701 (1997); R.I.
GEN. LAwS 31-22-1 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2570 (Law. Co-op. 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-6-105 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1111 (1987); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 46.61.600 (West 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.95.0 (West 1990); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 31-5-509 (Michie 1999).
122. See Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54, 56 (Fla. 1977)
(holding that if theft is foreseeable, then recovery is possible under statute requir-
ing removal of keys from unattended vehicle).
123. See Gmerek v. Rachlin, 390 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding defendant not liable to third persons injured in accident involving stolen
vehicle five and one-half months after theft of vehicle).
124. 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983) (denying summary judgment because
there was genuine issue of material fact necessary to determine whether criminal
activity was superseding cause), rev'd, 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985). The argu-
ment of criminal intervening cause acting as a superseding cause was apparently
not persuasive in the trial. See id. at 205-06; see also Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 935 F.
Supp. 1307, 1332 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying summary judgment to gun manufac-
turer on plaintiffs' theory of collective liability for negligence, thereby holding that
existence of criminal intervening cause does not automatically relieve manufactur-
ers of liability).
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cases because the cities suffer the same damage whether the victim was
shot by a gun purchaser or an intervening actor. Regardless of who pulls
the trigger, the city police must respond to the 911 call and the city hospi-
tal must treat any uninsured victims. The fact that one person was shot in
a domestic altercation and another victim was shot by a thief does not
change the accounting entry for the city. Both types of victims are equally
foreseeable by the gun manufacturers and both are expenses to the city.
Courts will likely hold the gun manufacturers liable for foreseeing that
some guns will be stolen and used in criminal acts and others will be
shipped from the South to New York and Chicago.
Saturday Night Specials are cheaply made hand guns that are very
inaccurate.' 25 People in the industry are aware that these guns are manu-
factured for and primarily sold to people surrounding and within ghet-
tos. 1 2 6 Courts may find manufacturers foresaw that these guns would be
used for illegal activities in congested cities. Some courts have not held
gun manufacturers to foresee criminal uses, however. For example, in
Richmond v. Charter Arms, a mother sued Charter Arms because a person
had used a gun manufactured by Charter Arms to rape and murder her
daughter.' 2 7 The trial court applied strict liability against the gun manu-
facturer.128 On appeal, however, the federal court reversed the verdict
against Charter Arms, holding that the rapist was a superseding cause, cut-
ting off the liability of the gun manufacturer.' 2 9 The gun manufacturer
did not foresee the criminal use. The court also noted that all of the prior
Louisiana cases dealing with strict liability based on the law of ultra-hazard-
ous activities involved land, whereas the marketing of handguns did
not.1 30 Therefore, strict liability did not apply.1
3
Although the intervening cause theory is one approach, a second ap-
proach to proximate cause analysis was developed by Dean Leon Green in
the late 1920s. The duty approach, otherwise known as the Green theory,
suggests that the judge ask the following question: "Does the defendant's
duty extend from this actor to this plaintiff for this particular injury?"'1 32
125. For a discussion of the Saturday Night Special, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of the Saturday Night Special as ghetto guns, see supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
127. See Richmond, 571 F. Supp. at 193-94 (noting that convicted rapist and
murderer used "snubnose .38," which was manufactured by Charter Arms, to rape,
kidnap and murder plaintiffs daughter).
128. See id. at 208 (holding that plaintiff could "proceed with her claim under
law of ultra-hazardous activities").
129. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 1985) (implicitly
reversing Charter Arms).
130. See id. at 1267 (discussing Louisiana's doctrine of ultra-hazardous
activities).
131. See id. at 1275 (holding that marketing of handguns falls beyond bounds
of doctrine of ultra-hazardous activities).
132. See Green, supra note 88, at 755-59 (discussing role of duty in determin-
ing proximate cause); see aLo Vandall, supra note 61, at 348 (discussing question
[Vol. 44: p. 547
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To answer the duty question, the court should weigh relevant factors in
the particular case. 13 3 Although Dean Green was loath to enumerate the
relevant factors because he preferred a flexible approach to justice, he
nevertheless suggested that in many negligence cases courts consider simi-
lar factors.1 3 4 These factors include: problems of judicial administration,
economic impact, justice, defendant's ability to carry the loss, prevention
and precedent.' 3 5 In regard to judicial administration, courts should ask
whether there are any particular administrative problems for the courts in
dealing with this case. 136 In reference to economic impact, courts should
consider the economic impact of holding gun manufacturers liable in a
case brought by the city. 137 In regard to justice, courts may inquire, as a
matter of fundamental fairness, on whom the loss should be placed, and
in regard to ability to carry the loss, courts may determine who should
bear the loss-the innocent victim of the shooting, in this case, the city, or
the gun manufacturers. 13 8 For the prevention factor, courts must con-
sider who is best able to prevent these losses, the gun manufacturer or the
city.
13 9
Courts should also consider what previous courts have decided on the
issue. These factors will guide courts in a duty analysis. The obvious pre-
cedent for these city suits is tobacco. Tobacco companies seem well-suited
to carrying cancer-caused losses. Some scholars have suggested, however,
that gun manufacturers are small and not nearly as profitable as tobacco
manufacturers and not well suited to bear the loss. 140 The small size of
the industry is not the reason for rejecting the suit, however.
The value of Dean Leon Green's duty theory is that it virtually elimi-
nates the concept of foreseeability from the analysis. 141 Judges no longer
necessary to determine proximate cause and distinguishing that from cause in
fact).
133. See Green, supra note 88, at 757 (listing policies that courts consider
when determining limits beyond which liability will not be extended).
134. See id. at 747 n.4 (citing reasons why courts have not extended liability);
see also Vandall, supra note 61, at 348 (discussing duty factors of precedent, preven-
tion, economic impact of decision, problems in administration, defendant's ability
to carry loss and justice).
135. See Green, supra note 88, at 757 n.4 (listing "stock" reasons courts have
used for not extending liability).
136. See id. at 757 (explaining various policy considerations for limiting
liability).
137. See id. 757-58 (considering economic consequences of extending
liability).
138. See id. at 757 (considering whether efforts to do justice in one case may
lead to injustice in other cases).
139. See id. at 759-60 (discussing that limits are set to enable preventive meas-
ures to be effective).
140. See Gun Lawsuits: The Fog of Battle, ECONoMisT, Feb. 20, 1999, at 26 (not-
ing that sales of guns in 1997 in United States totaled $1.4 billion compared to $48
billion in sales of tobacco products).
141. See Green, supra note 88, at 761-65 (limiting concept of foreseeability to
breach of duty question). Dean Green felt that intervening cause was merely a
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need to ask whether the result was foreseeable. They can now ask opera-
tive questions such as: what are the costs of this measure, what is the eco-
nomic impact of the decision and who can best do something about the
problem? These questions are more easily answered than the vague ques-
tion of whether the defendant could have foreseen the result.
To defend against a duty claim, it is likely that the gun manufacturers
will argue that there is no precedent in products liability cases for holding
the manufacturer liable for the wrongful acts of the consumer. The gun
manufacturers will contend that in superseding cause cases, the owner of
the vehicle is sued, not the manufacturer. For example, when a drunk
driver crashes an automobile into someone, the driver is sued, not Gen-
eral Motors. This, however, is a superficial analysis.
It is not unique for a corporation to be asked to pay for damages to
society for environmental degradation. For example, the purpose of the
environmental Superfund is to allow corporations to pre-pay for possible
damage to the environment, such as chemical spills.1 4 2 If a corporation
has toxic by-products, it will have to pay for their disposal. 1 43 It must also
pay for filters or baggers that are necessary to comply with the Clean Air
Act. 144 Similarly, since 1974, only drinkable water can be discharged from
point sources such as manufacturing plants.14 5 All products today, there-
fore, reflect the cost of complying with the clean air and clean water re-
quirements. There is nothing novel in asking the gun manufacturers to
pay for the damages they cause to society (the pollution, if you will) even
though they do not pull the trigger.
Another example of loss shifting is the disposal fee for automobile
tires.146 When new tires are purchased, the consumer must often pay a
disposal fee (directly or indirectly) for each used tire left at the tire deal-
subclass of duty and should be determined by issues of policy. See Leon Green,
Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, Pt. I, 28 TEX. L. REv. 621, 625 (1950) (ex-
plaining that determining duty depends on many factors, including intervening
factors).
142. See generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of The Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) (chronicling passage of Superfund bill as response to public
outcry for environmental cleanup).
143. See Martin A. McCrory, The Equitable Solution to Superfund Liability: Creat-
ing a Viable Allocation Procedure for Businesses at Superfund Sites, 23 VT. L. Rv. 59, 59
(1998) (noting that businesses spend over $30 million, on average, per Superfund
site, and have spent over $11.3 billion on CERCLA cleanups).
144. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
145. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
146. See Reid Lifset, Extended Producer Responsibility in North America: Progress,
Pitfalls, and Prospects in the Mid-1 990s, in Extended Producer Responsibility: A New Prin-
ciple for a New Generation of Pollution Prevention, Proceedings of the Symposium on Ex-
tended Producer Responsibility, Nov. 14-15, 1994, Wash., D.C., 46 (Catherine A. Wilt &
Gary A. Davis eds., 1995) (noting that 21 states have advanced disposal fees or form
of deposits for tires).
568 [Vol. 44: p. 547
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ers.147 The same is being asked of gun manufacturers. By holding them
liable, gun manufacturers are being asked to pay for the municipal de-
struction and costs of clean-ups produced by their products. It makes little
sense to place the costs of water pollution control on the car driver, but it
makes a great deal of sense to place it on the polluting factory owned by
General Motors.
To answer the question of who should be liable for gun violence, it is
helpful to rely on an approach developed over twenty years ago by Judge
Calabresi: the cheapest cost avoider theory. 14 8 Judge Calabresi suggested
that the loss in a products liability suit should be placed on whoever can
best analyze the problem and do something about it.149 In many cases,
the individual owner of the gun is the cheapest cost avoider. The owner
can secure the gun and keep it away from children. In other cases, the
cheapest cost avoider is the gun manufacturer. Gun manufacturers know
what types of guns are manufactured; they know who buys their guns; they
know how the guns are used; they know what types of injuries occur, and
whether those damages are increasing or decreasing; and they can do
something about it in terms of increasing the costs of the guns, redesign-
ing the guns, removing the guns from the market, creating locks for the
guns or adding computer-chip safety devices to the guns.
Helpful judicial precedent for holding the gun manufacturers liable
in the face of a criminal intervening cause is the Alabama Supreme Court
case of Kelly v. M. Trigg Enterprises, Inc.150 In Kelly, Nix, a 16-year-old,
purchased an air freshener, known as a "popper," which was commonly
used by teenagers as an inhalant.1 5 1 Nix inhaled the popper until she
became dizzy, and she then drove her car into traffic severely injuring
Kelly and others.1 52 The court reversed a summary judgment in favor of
the Ethyl Gaz retailer and distributor and found them liable. Although
Nix was a criminal intervening cause, the use of the product as an inhalant
was foreseeable and perhaps intended by the manufacturer. 153
147. See James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L.
1243, 1266 (1997) (explaining that "advanced disposal fees" are up-front charges
in purchase price of product that pay for ultimate disposal of product); see, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.7185 (West 1998) (requiring disposal fee of $1.50 for lead-
acid batteries).
148. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1093 (1972)
(discussing cheapest cost avoider theory in terms of entitlements, who is given
them and when they are protected).
149. See id. at 1096-97 (summarizing principles behind efficient allocation of
entitlements).
150. 605 So. 2d 1185 (Ala. 1992).
151. See id. at 1187 (noting that "poppers" have gained popularity as
inhalants).
152. See id. ("[Nix] ... felt dizzy and numb after inhaling the Ethyl Gaz.").
153. See id. at 1190 (stating that reasonable person could conclude that mis-
use of Ethyl Gaz as inhalant was foreseeable).
1999] 569
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Another precedent is the New York case, DeLong v. Erie County,
154
where the victim was murdered by a burglar.155 The police were held lia-
ble for this criminal intervening cause because they made a negligent mis-
take in responding to a "911" call from the victim.1 56 They misrecorded
the victim's address and failed to follow department policy. 15 7 In addi-
tion, in Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co.,1 58 the drug manufacturer placed a
warning on Chloromycetin, but was nevertheless held liable by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court because the manufacturer actively defeated the warn-
ing through over promotion of the product.
159
V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE PRODUCT?
The city of Chicago is apparently bringing its suit in design defect.
1 60
One of the issues that will be faced in the design defect case is whether
there is something wrong with the gun. 16 1 If the gun misfires or is highly
inaccurite, then it can be argued that there is something wrong with the
gun. If it is merely highly concealable, as is true with Saturday Night Spe-
cials, then the issue becomes more difficult because the gun is exactly as it
was designed-small and easily concealable. There is arguably nothing
"wrong" with it.
The city of Chicago could make an argument in response to the de-
fect argument that the gun manufacturers have not taken advantage of
technology to personalize guns. For example, cars have keys to start the
ignition. By merely removing the key, a car is thereby disabled. Gun man-
ufacturers, however, have done little to create similar mechanisms for
hand guns.162
154. 455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
155. See id. at 888 (stating that victim "was stabbed to death in her home by an
intruder").
156. See id. at 892-93 (finding municipality owed victim duty and that there
was proof that negligence was proximate cause of death).
157. See id. at 891 (noting that complaint writer mistakenly recorded victim's
address and failed in four respects to follow instructions for taking and recording
complaints).
158. 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973).
159. See id. at 662-65 (noting that Chloromycetin manufacturer distributed
calendars and other items and placed advertisements in magazines that "constantly
reminded physicians of the alleged effectiveness of the drug without mentioning
its dangers").
160. See Richard M. Daley, Chicago Mayor Explains His Novel Approach in Anti-
Gun Lawsuit, 13 ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1999, at 6 (explaining Chicago's lawsuit
against gun manufacturers).
161. See LeMaster v. Glock, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1336, 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (discussing whether absence of external safety may constitute defect in
gun); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 655 (Wash. 1986) (discussing
whether there is something wrong with design of mini-trail bike).
162. See David B. Ottaway, Weapon-Makers Divided on 'Smart Gun' Technology,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 20, 1999, at A10 (noting lack of electronic innovation
among gun manufacturers).
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Although many gun manufacturers are wary about equipping their
guns with safety mechanisms, the technology exists. There has been some
suggestion, for example, that there may be a computer chip available to
make guns safer.163 A chip could be placed in the gun that would interact
with a ring or a bracelet so that the gun would not fire without the chip
being in close proximity to the ring or bracelet.' 6 4 This mechanism could
decrease accidental gun deaths and hinder criminals who steal guns and
then use them to commit crimes.' 65 Another recent suggestion is a snap-
off hammer for the gun. 16 6 The owner takes the hammer off when the
gun is not in use, thereby disabling the gun. 167
VI. THE ISSUE OF GUN MANUFACTURERS' LIABILI Y IS FOR THE COURTS
Critics of the gun suits argue that these suits violate the separation of
powers that is fundamental to our republican form of government.168
They point to cases dating back to Marbury v. Madison1 69 as support for the
argument that the courts should refuse to hear the suits by the cities
against the gun manufacturers. 170 Guns are for the legislature, they ar-
gue.1 7 1 These critics refuse to accept that these municipal suits are simply
questions of who should bear the loss. The argument against passing the
issue of gun manufacturer liability to the legislature is that it is a simple
question of damages based on negligence, design defect, fraud or public
163. SeeJoe Kilsheimer, Reprogramming the Gun-Control Debate; Technological Ad-
vancements Could Improve Gun Safety and Change the Way Americans Think About Impos-
ing Limits on Personal Weapons, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 27, 1998, at GI (noting
Colt Manufacturing Company's plans to disclose its "smart gun," which uses com-
puter chip as safety device).
164. See Roane, supra note 40, at N.J. 1 (noting that while extensive electronic
technology exists, implementation is slow because it is not required by law).
165. See id. (noting benefits of such technology).
166. See A Questionable Way to Make Guns Safe, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 4, 1999,
at 4D (criticizing idea of removable hammer for guns).
167. SeeJoseph Hallinan, Firm Aims at Gun Safety Market with Removable Ham-
mer, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 12, 1999, at IC (noting invention of pistol hammer
that can be snapped in two to make gun inoperable and put back together to make
gun operable again).
168. See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the
Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REv. 303 (1996) (analyzing how develop-
ments in law of standing have affected political question doctrine); Louise Wein-
berg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 887 (noting
recent commentary on political question doctrine).
169. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (distinguishing between questions con-
cerning fights of individuals and questions that are political in nature).
170. See id. at 163-65 (stating that legal remedy is available when right is
violated).
171. See David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardner, The Sullivan Principles: Protect-
ing the Second Amendment from Civil Abuse, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 737, 749 (1995)
(stating that main reason courts should not hear cases against gun manufacturers
when product does not have genuine defect is that such suits "patently seek a rem-
edy which is appropriately dispensed by the legislature, not the judiciary").
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nuisance and that there is nothing so novel or complex that it should be
reserved for the legislature. 172
The courts have entertained damage suits against gun manufacturers
for over 150 years. The courts have dealt with the liability of gun manufac-
turers since the 1836 case of Langridge v. Levy, 173 where a gun dealer sold a
gun for use by the purchaser's child representing the gun to be safe.
1 7 4
When the child fired the gun, it exploded, injuring the child. 175 The
court allowed the parent to recover as representative for the child, even
though there was no privity between the child and the manufacturer.' 7 6
Recent cases have also considered the liability of the gun manufacturer.1 7 7
In 1993, for example, a disgruntled client entered a law firm in San Fran-
cisco and killed numerous lawyers and secretaries with three semiauto-
matic assault weapons.' 7 8 The suit was brought against the manufacturer
of the two of the semiautomatic assault weapons.
1 79
In a recent New York trial, Hamilton v. Accu-tek,180 the survivors of
several gun shot victims and one permanently disabled victim sued twenty-
five gun manufacturers for negligence.18 1 The jury found that the gun
manufacturers saturated southern states with guns while knowing that a
substantial portion of the weapons would reach the hands of criminals in
New York City. 1 82 The disabled victim was awarded over $500,000 against
172. SeeAbernathyv. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599, 605 (Mo. 1969) ("It
is neither realistic nor consistent with the common law tradition to wait upon the
legislature to correct an outmoded rule of case law.").
173. 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Exch. Ct. 1837), affd, 4 M. & W. 337,
150 Eng. Rep. 1458 (Exch. Chamber 1838).
174. See id. (noting gun manufacturer intentionally sold unsafe gun under
pretense that it was safe).
175. See id. at 519-20, 863-64.
176. See id. at 524-25, 865-66 (explaining that duty of reasonable care exists
when supplying dangerous object regardless of existence of contract).
177. See First Commercial Trust v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 77 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding guardian of estate of minor shooting victim did not have negli-
gence cause of action against gun manufacturer because manufacturer owed no
duty to victim); Clark v. Jesuit High Sch., 686 So. 2d 998, 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of BB gun manufacturer because
"[p]roduct misuse was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries, not product de-
fect"); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of gun manufacturer).
178. See Merril v. Navgar, Inc., 1999 Cal. App. Lexis 878 (Cal. App. Sept. 29,
1999).
179. See Larry D. Hatfield et al., Highrise Massacre, S.F. EXAMINER, July 2, 1993,
at Al (noting that assailant killed eight and wounded six with two Luger TEC-9
pistols and .45-caliber handgun and noting that all three weapons were legal in
state of California).
180. No. CV-95-0049, 1999 WL 363022 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 1999).
181. See id. at *1 (noting that relatives of six people killed by guns and one
disabled survivor brought negligence suits against 25 gun manufacturers).
182. See Laura Mansnerus, Moving Target: Gun Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1999, at Al (discussing recent judicial attacks on gun manufacturers).
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a portion of the gun manufacturers. 183 Conceptually, this was a much
more challenging case than the cities will face because the plaintiffs had to
prove the guns that injured them were part of the over-supply.
Suits in Washington, D.C. and Maryland have involved Saturday Night
Specials.' 8 4 In Kelley v. PG. Indus., Inc.,185 the Supreme court of Maryland
held that the Saturday Night Special was unique and therefore it was
within the power of the common law to hold the manufacturer of such a
unique and dangerous weapon strictly liable.1 8 6 On appeal, the plaintiff
did not defend, and therefore the decision was vacated.' 8 7
Recently, Washington, D.C. passed an ordinance holding manufactur-
ers of automatic weapons strictly liable. 188 This was followed by ordi-
nances in several other cities holding the manufacturers of automatic
weapons strictly liable. 189 Congress has decided to deal with the question
of who can purchase a gun in the Brady Bill and has dodged the more
important question of whether manufacturers should be liable.190 Con-
gress has since banned the importation and sale of assault weapons. 19 1
Congress has had over 150 years to deal with the question of whether
the gun manufacturer should be liable for injuries resulting from gun vio-
lence. 19 2 State and federal constitutions guarantee everyone a day in
183. See Gottlieb & Willingham, supra note 1, at Bi (reporting that jury
awarded $560,000 to one plaintiff).
184. See Delahanty v. Hinckley, 686 F. Supp. 920, 920 (D.D.C. 1986) (arising
from attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc. 497
A.2d 1143, 1158-59 (Md. 1985) (finding that it is consistent with public policy to
hold manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials strictly liable to victims of criminal
use of guns).
185. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
186. See id. (holding that if trier of fact determined gun was Saturday Night
Special then liability against manufacturer could be imposed).
187. See id. at 1144-46 (explaining procedural history and background of suit
against gun manufacturer).
188. See Voters' Courage on Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at A24 (reporting
on passage of Assault Weapon Manufacturing Act of 1990).
189. See FrankJ. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Sec-
tion 2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMPLE L. REv. 167, 194 n.172 (1995) (noting that Wash-
ington D.C., through referendum, voted to hold gun manufacturers liable for
deaths caused by their weapons).
190. For a further discussion of the Brady Bills' effectiveness in stopping the
sale of guns to thousands of felons each year, see supra notes 58-60 and accompa-
nying text.
191. See Michael G. Lenett, Taking a Bite Out of Violent Crime, 20 U. DAYrON L.
REv. 573, 580 (1995) (noting that since 1968, semiautomatic assault weapons have
been banned from importation into United States). The ATF banned the importa-
tion of 43 types of assault rifles in 1989. See id. ("Although ATF banned the impor-
tation of forty-three models of assault rifles in 1989, it allowed the importation of
assault pistols to continue freely.").
192. SeeLangridgev. Levy, 2 M. &W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 864 (Exch. Ct. 1837)
(addressing liability of gun manufacturer), affd, 4 M. & W. 337, 150 Eng. Rep.
1458 (Exch. Chamber 1838).
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court.1 9 3 Congressional avoidance of the issue of gun suits requires that
the issue be left to the courts. 194 Indeed, if Congress determines that gun
manufacturer liability is inappropriate in the courts, it is free to act.' 95
They have had the opportunity to remove guns from the courts since 1836
in Langridge v. Levy. 196 Although Langridge is a British case, it functioned
as an invitation to Parliament and Congress to respond to the issue of gun
manufacturer liability. Congress remains free to assume jurisdiction, but
having failed to do so in a meaningful way, the cities should not be left
without a remedy for their losses. 19 7
The courts make law through accretion, modifying the preceding
case by detail, and in that way develop the common law. 19 8 The history of
torts rests on this concept.199 It is clear that over the last 150 years the
193. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13
("[Elvery person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputa-
tion shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be ad-
ministered without sale, denial or delay."); IND. CONsT. art. I, § 12 ("All courts shall
be open; and every man, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law."); PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("All courts
shall be open; and every man for an injury done him ... shall have remedy by due
course of law .... ); Ws. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("Every person is entitled to a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries .... ").
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law .. "); see also IND. CONST. art. I, § 12
("All courts shall be open; and every man, for injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."). By failing to
pass legislation on the issue, Congress has defacto signaled to the Judiciary that it is
a matter within their jurisdiction.
195. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850) (holding that
Congress may limit lower federal court jurisdiction); see also International Science
& Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc. 106 F.3d 1146, 1158 (4th Cir.
1997) (concluding that Congress intended private TCPA actions to be brought
exclusively in state courts and did not intend to grant jurisdiction over such claims
in federal district courts). If Congress felt that the matter was inappropriate for
state courts to decide, it could pass a law governing the gun industry. So far they
have failed to take any such action.
196. 4 M. & W. 337 (1838) (affirming holding that gun maker is liable for
injury to buyer's child).
197. See Pruitt, supra note 53, at BI (noting that Georgia legislature has passed
act that forbids suits by cities against gun manufacturers). Atlanta's mayor, Bill
Campbell, believes the law will be struck down for denying the city the right to
enforce its police powers. See id.
198. See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L.
REv. 263, 271 (1992) ("Common law develops by accretion, and the requirement
that judges justify what they do by reference to prior decisions, together with a
pervasively conservative professional culture, discourage radical change."); C.
Douglas Floyd, Vertical Antitrust Conspiracies After Monsanto and Russell Stover, 33
U. KAN. L. RhV. 269, 297 (1985) ("The concept that the common law develops by a
process of accretion of numerous decisions, each focused on the narrow issue
before the court is well established and has helpful descriptive and normative
qualities.").
199. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, at 19-20 (describing role of common
law adjudication in tort law).
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common law has dealt with gun manufacturer liability in a large number
of cases. This is interstitial common law development: the courts were
asked who should be held liable for the damage. The criminal firing the
handgun is liable but the criminal is impecunious and in prison. Now the
cities are merely asking whether the manufacturer can be held liable for
the damages the municipalities have suffered, or should the loss remain
with the taxpayers.
VII. THESE ARE BASIC DAMAGE SUITS
The suits brought by cities against gun manufacturers are ordinary
tort suits for damages. The only novel aspect of the suits is that the munic-
ipalities are the plaintiffs. The foreseeable results of saturation gun sales
and defective guns are death, injury and great expenses for the cities. The
gun manufactures are merely being asked to take cognizance of the prob-
lem, to change their ways and to pay the cities for their past and future
expenses brought on by the excess gun profits. The profits of the gun
manufacturers are excessive to the extent that the manufacturers have
shifted the costs of violence to the municipalities and other victims.
200
200. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-4
(1980) (noting strict liability leads to efficient result); Joi Gardner Pearson, Com-
ment, Make It, Market It, and You May Have to Pay for It: An Evaluation of Gun Manu-
facturer Liability for the Criminal Use of Uniquely Dangerous Firearms in Light of In Re 101
California Street, 1997 BYU L. REv. 131, 159 (1997) (arguing that gun manufactur-
ers should bear burden of costs of injuries from their products rather than forcing
tax payers to bear burden); see also Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co. 701 P.2d 222,
229 (Idaho 1985) (Bisdine, J., dissenting) (noting that compensation to those in-
jured by product or industry is part of external costs to be borne by industry).
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